Turla Group Deploys Cereal Malware to Spy on Government Email Systems
The Russia-aligned group Turla has successfully deployed a modular .NET toolset known as Cereal on Microsoft Exchange servers belonging to two government organizations, one in Kazakhstan and another in Romania. This sophisticated malware allows the group to extract selected emails directly from the mail flow, as discovered by ESET researchers.
Cereal operates without requiring an attacker-owned server. Instead, it sends commands disguised as ordinary Outlook Web Access, Autodiscover, and ActiveSync traffic to the compromised Exchange servers. This makes the malicious activity appear as regular email access to anyone monitoring the network. In the case of Romania, the malware was configured to specifically target emails sent to or received from NATO and EU addresses.
ESET's researcher Matías Porolli explained that the most critical actions on a compromised Exchange server often occur unnoticed. For instance, an official in a national government might send an email to a colleague at a military alliance. While the email appears to be sent normally, a piece of code quietly examines it, identifies it as significant, and creates a copy to be forwarded to unauthorized recipients, all while the original email continues its journey.
The malware was first identified on November 28, 2025, at a Kazakh government entity, with ESET later detecting the Romanian victim on December 23, 2025. ESET attributes the Cereal malware to Turla with high confidence, citing a component linked to Turla and similarities to previous malware used by the group. Turla, also known as Snake, is widely recognized as part of Russia's FSB.
Interestingly, activity in Kazakhstan saw a spike on January 15, 2026, coinciding with the Old New Year, a holiday still observed in Russia, suggesting that the operators may have taken the day off.
Mechanisms of Cereal Malware's Operation
CerealNeuron, the primary backdoor, resides on the Exchange server and listens for incoming web requests that mimic normal Exchange traffic. When a request is properly encrypted and passes integrity checks, it is decrypted and executed as a command. Otherwise, it returns a legitimate-looking error page. ESET was unable to trace the IP addresses from which the operators connected, effectively making the victim the host for the attacker's command server.
Each command sent to the server is a small, compiled .NET program designed for specific tasks such as pulling mailboxes, querying Active Directory, extracting Windows credentials, or reading and deleting files. The presence of numerous similar binaries indicates a framework capable of automatically generating commands. Additionally, a second backdoor, CerealHermit, operates without network access, reading encrypted command files directly from disk, providing operators with a backup method of control.
Turla has previously exploited Exchange transport agents, which are plugins that integrate into mail flow for various tasks. However, CerealBox, a component of the malware, avoids detection by injecting itself into the EdgeTransport.exe process, which is responsible for moving mail, thus maintaining the flow of emails without appearing as a new agent in the Exchange configuration.
Intelligence Reviewed
CerealBox specifically targets messages containing .doc, .docx, or .pdf attachments that match predetermined criteria related to senders, recipients, subject lines, or attachment names. It compresses, encrypts, and stores these messages on disk for later retrieval by the operators. ESET notes that this method of hooking into the transport service from within has not been documented for any malware family before.
The loader for Cereal is the only component that is saved as a recognizable .NET file on disk. It executes native code before the .NET runtime begins its standard operations, making it appear inactive to analysts examining its .NET code. In one instance, it masqueraded as ncobjapi.dll in the Windows System32 directory, where it was automatically loaded by the Windows Management Instrumentation service. In another case, it posed as wbemcomn.dll. The operators also placed copies in the .NET native image cache under names like Microsoft.Exchange.Search.Mdb.ni.dll, ensuring that the malicious file was loaded before the legitimate library.




