Turla Hackers Deploy Cereal Malware to Target Government Email Servers
The Russian state-backed threat group Turla has been employing a new malicious toolset called 'Cereal' to intercept emails on Microsoft Exchange servers at government organizations. Researchers at cybersecurity firm ESET documented these attacks in late 2025, initially discovering modular .NET malware at a government body in Kazakhstan.
A month later, ESET identified the same toolset at a government agency in Romania, where it selectively gathered email correspondence with representatives of NATO and the European Union. According to ESET's report, the malware was configured to collect messages containing document attachments like .DOC, .DOCX, and .PDF files, while adhering to specific sender, recipient, and subject criteria.
Turla, also known as Snake, Secret Blizzard, and Waterbug, is a cyber-espionage group that has been active for over two decades and is linked to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). In the campaign analyzed by ESET, the hackers utilized the Cereal toolset, particularly a component named CerealBox, to inject into Exchange's EdgeTransport.exe process and hijack existing transport agents' handlers. This method allows the malware to execute commands in memory and inspect email content without registering a new transport agent or disrupting normal email delivery.
Another component of the malware, CerealNeuron, awaits incoming encrypted web requests on paths that mimic legitimate Exchange services, carrying commands for execution. CerealNeuron checks and decrypts these requests before executing the supplied CerealRunner program, which contains the code the attackers wish to run. Commands may include retrieving emails from Exchange, querying Active Directory for users and groups, extracting locally stored credentials, and reading or deleting files.
Insights into Cereal Malware's Architecture
ESET noted that the sheer volume of similar binaries, each compiled for specific tasks, suggests that the operators have an internal framework that automates the compilation and packaging of commands. This indicates a mature, well-engineered platform rather than a disorganized collection of scripts.
The CerealRunner components contain encrypted .NET programs and the necessary arguments for execution, which run in the host's memory and return their output to CerealNeuron. Eventually, CerealNeuron encrypts this output and sends it back to the attackers. ESET observed no external command-and-control infrastructure used in the attack, making the compromised Exchange server the sole control point.
Final Brief
Additionally, ESET uncovered a variant of CerealNeuron called CerealHermit, which lacks network capabilities and instead reads commands from encrypted files on the disk. CerealHermit may serve as a fallback system when Neuron's web channel is unavailable, although ESET did not explain how attackers place Hermit's command files on the server or retrieve execution results.
The advanced concealment methods employed by Cereal demonstrate Turla's deep understanding of .NET execution techniques, including the exploitation of the .NET native image cache to operate within legitimate processes. ESET characterized the Cereal toolset as designed for long-term, stealthy cyber-espionage, featuring a small disk footprint and relying on infrastructure that is less likely to be detected and blocked. The company has shared an extended list of indicators of compromise on its GitHub page.




