Russian Cyberespionage Group COLD RELIC Exploits Cloud Breaches
A Russian cyberespionage group known as COLD RELIC is reportedly posing as employees of organizations it has previously breached in order to phish new targets, according to findings from the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG). This group, which is also referred to as Star Blizzard, Callisto, and Gossamer Bear, is believed to operate under the auspices of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). COLD RELIC primarily targets government officials, defense contractors, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) across Europe and North America.
The group is recognized for executing sophisticated phishing and malware campaigns aimed at accessing information of strategic or political significance to the Russian government. Researchers noted that COLD RELIC has not garnered as much public attention as other Russian cyber groups, yet it has successfully infiltrated high-value targets. Once a target is compromised, the group utilizes stolen emails and data to create authentic pretexts, allowing them to impersonate contacts when reaching out to subsequent targets.
The initial intrusion by COLD RELIC began with the theft of credentials for a Super Admin account. The attackers logged in using a US residential proxy located near the victim's site to avoid triggering alerts for impossible travel. They continued to send multi-factor authentication (MFA) push requests until the account holder approved one. With administrative rights, they downloaded the entire contents of the organization's cloud drive, exported employee lists, and initiated a domain-wide data export through Google Workspace Customer Takeout. They also examined audit logs to determine what defenders could see and manipulated Alert Center notifications to eliminate forensic evidence of their initial breach.
To maintain their access, the attackers enrolled their own passkeys, MFA backup codes, and devices. They remained undetected for several months, syncing inboxes to external email clients and ensuring their passkeys persisted across password resets and device registration controls. The situation was exacerbated by employees storing passwords in the company’s cloud storage, which the attackers exploited to access other accounts, including personal accounts that were typically unmonitored by employers.
Even after the organization attempted to remove the intruders, GTIG observed COLD RELIC sending phishing emails from accounts masquerading as its employees to colleagues and contacts in the same professional networks. In 2026, an individual impersonating an employee from the initial victim organization contacted someone at a second US organization via an encrypted messaging app, sharing phishing links during the conversation.
Techniques for Phishing and Credential Theft
These phishing links were crafted to steal credentials and authentication tokens for Entra ID, redirecting victims to document lures relevant to the ongoing discussion to avoid raising suspicion. Upon successful authentication, COLD RELIC registered and utilized a new MFA device within the single sign-on (SSO) solution to maintain access to the user account throughout the intrusion.
By impersonating known contacts within the same professional circles, COLD RELIC significantly increased the likelihood of successful phishing attempts. The group's phishing links often connected the two cases, utilizing a compromised website that checks visitors before redirecting them to the phishing domain. Attackers frequently included a link parameter referencing a previous victim or lure. A redirector URL from a second intrusion was submitted to VirusTotal in June 2026, with parameters referencing the first victim organization.
Clearance Granted
After the breach, the attacker altered their profile name on the messaging app to assume a completely new identity, likely to approach other organizations within the same professional circles. In at least one instance, a victim recognized the intrusion and reset passwords on affected accounts. However, COLD RELIC had hijacked sessions that were never revoked, allowing them to retain access. Google warns that simply changing passwords is insufficient to eliminate the threat.
COLD RELIC's operations illustrate the intersection of human-centric social engineering and cloud identity abuse. By gaining access to strategic personnel rosters and operational documents, Russian intelligence services can transform legitimate business communications into attack vectors against trusted partners. Their ability to navigate across multiple cloud ecosystems underscores the necessity for organizations to adopt a holistic approach to defending their entire identity estate.




